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COMMENTS
The Toothless Watchdog: Corporate Fraud
and the Independent Audit - How Can the
Public's Confidence Be Restored?
I. INTRODUCTION
"Th[e] 'public watchdog' function [of the Certified Public
Accountant in performing independent audits] demands that the account-
ant maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires
complete fidelity to the public trust."' This statement by Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the United States Supreme Court, illustrates the pub-
lic's perception and expectations of the independent audit.2 However, in
the wake of recent corporate mega-scandals, 3 public confidence in the
attest function,4 particularly the independence of auditors, has been
shaken.5 Lawmakers have been quick to criticize the accounting profes-
sion, suggesting that the auditors of the companies involved in these
scandals were either complacent or complicit. In July 2002, Congress,
in a rush to prevent further fraud and restore confidence in the financial
markets, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "Act").6
As a former auditor at a Big Five,7 now Big Four, accounting firm,
1. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984).
2. Dan Bilefsky, Dutch 'Pitbull' Was Challenging Accountants Long Before Enron, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 18, 2002.
3. Although the bankruptcy of Enron has captured the public's attention, there have been
others (e.g., Sunbeam, WorldCom, Adelphia, Parmalat).
4. An attestation service is defined as "an engagement in which a practitioner is engaged to
issue, or does issue, a written communication that expresses a conclusion about the reliability of a
written assertion that is the responsibility of another party." Statement on Standards for
Attestation Engagements, No. 1 at § 100.1.
5. Cassell Bryan-Low, Deloitte Yearly Revenue Rose 21% Even with Consulting Unit Issues,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2003.
6. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
7. The Big Five referred to the five largest accounting firms: PricewaterhouseCoopers,
Andersen (formerly Arthur Andersen prior to the somewhat hostile spinoff of its major consulting
arm, Anderson Consulting), Deloitte & Touche, KPMG Peat Marwick, and Ernst & Young. In
June 2002, Andersen was convicted by a jury of obstruction of justice and sentenced by Judge
Melinda Harmon, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, to five years
probation and a $500,000 fine. See Anderson Sentenced to 5 Years Probation, WALL ST. J., Oct.
17, 2002, available at 2002 WL-WSJ 3409072. As of the date of this Comment, Andersen had
surrendered most of its state licenses to practice accounting. Consequently, partners and
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I submit that current efforts to reform the accounting profession, though
necessary, miss the mark. Congressional efforts aimed at improving
auditor independence focus on providing the following remedies: curb-
ing the amount and type of consulting services accounting firms can
provide to audit clients, restricting client employment of former outside
audit personnel, and requiring audit partner rotation. Although some of
these reforms are necessary and would improve auditor independence,
others are costly and fail to address significant factors underlying the
diminution of audit quality. By addressing conflicts of interest through
increasing already significant audit client employment restrictions, Con-
gress has failed to recognize that longstanding institutional relationships
between accounting firms and their clients greatly impact public percep-
tion of auditor independence. Further, although additional restrictions
on non-audit fees may improve auditor independence, they do not
improve audit quality because they do not change the relationship
between audit fees and audit quality. To fill these regulatory gaps,
mandatory rotation of audit firms and a change in audit fee structure are
necessary.
This Comment discusses some of the current legislative efforts at
regaining public confidence in the financial markets through regulation
of the independent audit. Further, it suggests additional measures to
address the gaps left by these legislative efforts. Part II provides a brief
history of the public accounting profession, its role with respect to finan-
cial markets, and the structure of its regulatory environment. Part III
discusses incentives to commit corporate fraud or engage in overly
aggressive accounting practices. Part IV describes conflicts of interest
inherent in the triangular relationship among the auditor, the company
under audit, and the public. Part V discusses current efforts to deal with
corporate fraud and accounting irregularities through reformation of the
accounting profession, focusing primarily on the Act and whether it will
accomplish its drafters' objectives. Part VI argues for mandatory rota-
tion of audit firms and a change in audit fee structure.
II. THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTING PROFESSION AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO
THE CAPITAL MARKETS
A. A Brief History of Modern Public Accounting
The public accounting profession's genesis was in large part a reac-
tion to nineteenth century corporate abuses of the public's trust.8 The
associates have flocked to other accounting and consulting firms, which are eager to sign up
former Andersen clients.
8. See Jordan H. Liebman & Anne S. Kelly, Accountant's Liability to Third Parties for
Negligent Misrepresentation: The Search for a New Limiting Principle, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 345,
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need to channel capital into credit markets in the 1900s required regain-
ing public trust in bankers and securities professionals by subjecting
internal corporate affairs to greater public exposure.9 Although this
movement was furthered by the leaders of the New York Stock
Exchange,' 0 "the essential principles of classical economics
remained dominant in financial circles, so that the option of direct fed-
eral regulation to control corruption and fraud was resisted."" Because
direct federal intervention in corporate affairs would have subjected
managerial decisions to ex ante scrutiny, such intervention would have
run contrary to unfettered competition, a fundamental tenet of classical
economics. Nevertheless, to provide increased corporate transparency,
the public turned to the accounting profession.
Because there was little demand from the government for audited
financial statements of privately held corporations, accountants focused
on non-attest services such as tax consulting, budgeting, and internal
costing systems.' 2 The derivation of significant fees from non-attest
functions and the lack of comparable audit fees resulted in a congruence
of corporate and public accountants' interests and strengthened the
accountants' view of themselves as business advisors rather than watch-
dogs.' 3 Consequently, there was little debate about accountants' respon-
sibility to parties other than their corporate clients.' 4 Further, early
judicial decisions seemed to reinforce the belief that accountants had
little responsibility to the public.' 5
Until the crash of 1929, investors and creditors seemed reasonably
satisfied with corporate disclosures of financial information certified by
accounting firms.' 6 However, because the accountant-client relationship
structure had become so entrenched, reformers pushed for government
regulation requiring auditors to provide the public with complete disclo-
353-54 (1992) (citing GARY J. PREVITS & BARBARA D. MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTING IN
AMERICA 129 (1979)).
9. Id. at 354.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id. at 355. Reduced to a simple proposition, corporate interests are to maximize
shareholder wealth, generally through profit generation. Because non-attest fees often can be
linked to the efficacy of the accountant's advisory services, accountants providing non-attest
services may have a direct interest in the profitability of their clients.
14. See Rebecca L. Sczepanski, Stockier v. Rose: Michigan's Role in the "Play" of Third
Party Liability for Negligent Accounting, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 195, 197 (1995).
15. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931) (holding that if there has
been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere profession, but only honest blunder, negligence
will not lie).
16. LIEBMAN & KELLY, supra note 8, at 356.
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sure of their corporate clients' financial positions.' 7 Thus, with the
enactment of the Securities Act of 1933,18 issuers seeking to offer secur-
ities to the public had to register such offerings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") and were required to file comprehen-
sive financial statements certified by independent accountants. 19
In the half-century following the crash, the entrepreneurial role of
the accountant continued relatively unchallenged. It was not until the
late 1970s, when massive investment funds were acquiring larger por-
tions of American corporate equity, that the need for more reliable finan-
cial information became evident.20 Because corporate equity continued
to be spread over a greater number of investors, the relationship between
stockholders and corporate managers was becoming more impersonal.
Thus, rather than each investor verifying corporate information, effi-
ciency demanded that one disinterested party perform the task. Recog-
nizing this need, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
("AICPA") stated in its Professional Standards that it supports the pro-
fession's responsibility to the public, a responsibility that has grown as
the number of investors has grown and as government reliance on
accounting information increases. 2' Also, in 1984 Chief Justice Burger
conveyed the Supreme Court's view of the public accountant's role
when he assigned the term "public watchdog" to the profession.22
The role of the public accountant as a watchdog seemed to pervade
the public's perception through the 1980s.23 Claims against public
accountants, alleging either negligence or fraud, were rife throughout the
1990s, 24 and it is clear that public perception has changed little, if at all,
17. Id. at 357. "Some studies have advanced the theory that full disclosure would not have
prevented the crash because it has never been established that investors prior to 1929 actually
received inadequate information." Id. at n.55.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2000).
19. See id. at § 77s(a). Comparable disclosure requirements may also be found in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2000), the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, see id. at § 79n, and the Investment Company Act of 1940, see id. at
§ 80a-37(a).
20. LrEBMAN & KELLY, supra note 8, at 360.
21. Id. at 361 (citing AICPA Professional Standards, Code of Professional Ethics ET § 51.04
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants (CCH) 1984)).
22. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984).
23. See, e.g., Robert Chatov, The Possible New Shape of Accounting in the United States, 4 J.
AcCT. & PUB. POL'Y 161 (1985). Referring to foreign bribes by American businesses, Chatov
wrote: "The fact remained that outside auditors had failed to uncover the criminal activity rife
among many of the largest U.S. corporations. Today, the events under scrutiny ... have been
termed audit failures involving major business firms and banks." Id. at 163.
24. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993); Endo v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
S.C., 163 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1999); Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998);
Rodney v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 143 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 1998).
[Vol. 58:891
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since then.25
B. The Scope of the Independent Audit and Its Role
in the Capital Markets
Accountants play many roles in society. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant is that of the auditor.26 Much like investment bankers and securities
lawyers, auditors function as gatekeepers to financial markets. Because
"[o]ver time, individuals and institutions acquire reputation based on
their behavior, '27 entities acquire what is commonly known as "reputa-
tional capital." By leveraging their reputational capital, accounting
firms use trust to reduce their clients' costs of capital transactions.28
This is accomplished by giving assurance to capital markets, more effi-
ciently than their clients, that issuers of financial statements conform to
certain generally accepted standards.29 Such efficiency is gained by
allowing investors to rely on the work of one party, the auditor, whose
interests are purportedly consistent with those of the investors, as
opposed to issuers opening their books to each investor.
Generally, the public's expectations of an independent audit are
only tangentially related to audit efficacy. Although the limitations of
an audit are well known to auditors, such is often not the case for users
of audited financial information. Frequently, the public mistakenly
assumes that auditors are "responsible for identifying and disclosing all
instances of fraudulent financial reporting and illegal activities."3
Those who are not immersed in company finances often liken the role of
an independent auditor to that of an Internal Revenue Service auditor.
Even those who are so immersed may be confused as to the scope and
purpose of an audit. As a former auditor, I am constantly reminded of
25. See Bryan-Low, supra note 5.
26. Norman S. Johnson & Ross A. Albert, "Deja Vu All Over Again": The Securities and
Exchange Commission Once More Attempts to Regulate the Accounting Profession Through Rule
102(e) of Its Rules of Practice, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 553, 556.
27. Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposalfor a Modified Strict Liability
Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 494 (2001).
28. See id.
29. The standards used by auditors of publicly held entities are Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). However, other bases of accounting exist and may be
requested in other engagements. For instance, financial reports may be generated using the cash
basis of accounting. Such a basis does not seek to match revenues with the costs incurred to
produce those revenues, but rather reports costs as they are actually paid. Cash basis often is
required by the Internal Revenue Service for income tax purposes. See infra for a more detailed
discussion of GAAP.
30. Andrew W. Reiss, Note, Powered by More Than GAAS: Section IOA of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act Takes the Accounting Profession for a New Ride, 25 HOFsTRA L.
REV. 1261, 1273 1070 PLI/CORP 705, 718-19 (1997). "This misconception is commonly referred
to as the 'expectation gap.'" Id. at 1273 n.45.
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the lengthy discourse required to explain the role of the independent
auditor to clients.
To understand the gap between public expectations and those of the
auditor (the "expectation gap"), it is important to understand the purpose
of a financial statement audit from the perspective of the profession and
the tools used by the auditor to complete the task. Such an understand-
ing is necessary if the expectation gap is to be bridged. Bridging the gap
better positions the public to decide what further assurance, if any, it
needs for investment decisions and whether the benefit of additional
assurance exceeds the cost. That said, "[t]he objective of an audit of
financial statements by the independent auditor is the expression of an
opinion of the fairness with which [the financial statements] present in
all material respects, financial position, results of operations, and . . .
cash flows in conformity with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples." The objective is accomplished primarily by evaluating account-
ing records and other relevant information.
Two concepts in particular contribute significantly to the expecta-
tion gap: "materiality" and "reasonable assurance."32 Though relatively
routine to the auditor, the word "material" denotes a pecuniary concept
foreign to the general public. "The concept of materiality recognizes
that some matters, either individually or in the aggregate, are important
for fair presentation of financial statements ... while others are not."33
Put differently, materiality means "the magnitude of an omission or mis-
statement of accounting information that, in light of the surrounding cir-
cumstances, makes it probable that the judgment of a reasonable person
relying on the information would have been changed or influenced by
the omission or misstatement. 34
The cause of a misstatement is also a factor in the determination of
materiality. For example, an illegal payment of an otherwise immaterial
amount could be material if there is a reasonable chance that the pay-
ment could lead to a material contingent liability. Even though the
profession provides general guidelines, materiality is determined by the
auditor's professional judgment based on his or her experience as well
as various other factors.36
31. AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 1, AU
§ 110.01 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2001) [Hereinafter SAS].
32. The contribution of reasonable assurance to the expectation gap is particularly apparent in
the area of the auditors' responsibility to detect their clients' illegal acts. See Reiss, supra note 30,
at 1276.
33. SAS No. 47, supra note 31, at AU § 312.03.
34. Id. at AU § 312.10.
35. Id. at AU § 312.11.
36. See id. at AU § 312.09-25. Determination of materiality requires consideration of both
quantitative and qualitative factors. Materiality is first assessed in the planning stage of the audit
[Vol. 58:891
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Materiality must be applied contextually and therefore varies from
entity to entity. Because those unfamiliar with the concept of materiality
tend to relate the value of a potential misstatement to their own financial
worth, rather than to the worth of the entity under audit, auditors have
come to anticipate the incredulity of a layperson who has just been told
that one million dollars is immaterial to the financial statements of a
company whose balance sheet shows net assets in excess of one billion
dollars.
The auditor must plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable
assurance about whether its client's financial statements are free of
material misstatement, whether caused by error or fraud.37 Because of
the nature of audit evidence and the characteristics of fraud, an audit can
provide reasonable, but not absolute, assurance that the financial state-
ments are free of material misstatements.3" One of the primary tools
used by the auditor to achieve reasonable assurance is sampling. Sam-
pling is the process by which a population of accounting information,
such as all accounts receivable on the last day of the entity's year, is
tested through evaluation of a sample of that population.39 Sampling
can be either statistical or non-statistical, both of which require the audi-
tor's professional judgment. Because less than 100 percent of the popu-
lation is tested, it is possible that a material misstatement may not be
detected. Further, given the nature of fraud, even if underlying financial
records of an entire population are tested, an intentional misstatement
(i.e., fraud) may be difficult to uncover.4"
Given the use of ambiguous terms such as "fairness," in all "mate-
rial respects," and "reasonable" in the standard audit opinion,4" congres-
and is generally calculated as a percentage of net income or loss, total assets, net assets or revenue
depending on the characteristics of the industry and individual entity. Other factors include, but
are not limited to, internal control structure, complexity of business transactions, integrity of
management and ability of accounting staff. See id.
37. SAS No. 1, supra note 31, at AU § 110.02. A material misstatement can be either
intentional or unintentional. An intentional misstatement can be fraudulent.
38. Id.
39. For example, when testing revenue recognition of a software company that sells licenses
bundled with support services, the auditor will likely perform the following: 1) obtain the numbers
of the first and last invoices generated during the reporting period; 2) input those numbers into a
computer program to generate a random sample based on the size of the population and the level
of confidence desired by the auditor; 3) pull the selected invoices; and 4) review the invoices and
trace the transactions back through the accounting records to ensure proper recognition of
revenue.
40. Fraud can involve multiple parties in complicity to misappropriate assets or misrepresent
financial information. Also, underlying third party data or company records used as audit
evidence can be falsified. Though complicity is less common, it is much more difficult to detect.
41. Following is an example of a standard unqualified or "clean" audit report covering a
single year:
Independent Auditor's Report
20041
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sional and public frustration with and confusion about the independent
audit are easily understood.42 In fact, it is these very terms that may
provide the fodder for claims against accounting firms in shareholder
derivative suits and direct actions. Because the cost of complete assur-
ance would be prohibitive, it is unlikely that capital markets would ever
demand such assurance of auditors. Until they do, auditors must qualify
their opinions with such malleable language.
Despite concerted efforts by the profession, auditors have been con-
stantly reminded that they have failed to close the expectation gap.
Because the current post-Enron atmosphere demands more from capital
market gatekeepers, I believe that now is the time for the accounting
profession to join with lawmakers in an effort to close the expectation
gap and help restore confidence in the independence of public
accountants.43
C. Self-Regulation: GAAP, GAAS, and the Audit
Also important to understanding the accounting profession is an
awareness of its regulatory structure and environment. The accounting
profession is largely self-regulated. Self-regulation of the accounting
industry can be traced to just after the establishment of the SEC by the
Securities Exchange Act of 19 34.4 "The SEC was given statutory
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of X Company as of December
31, 20XX, and the related statements of income, retained earnings, and cash flows
for the year then ended. These financial statements are the responsibility of the
Company's management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these
financial statements based on our audit.
We conducted our audit in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in
the United States of America. Those standards require that we plan and perform the
audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free
of material misstatement. An audit includes examining on a test basis, evidence
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also
includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by
management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We
believe that our audit provides a reasonable basis for our opinion.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all
material respects, the financial position of X Company as of December 31, 20XX,
and the results of its operations and its cash flows for the year then ended in
conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of
America.
SAS No. 58, supra note 31, at AU § 508.08 (emphasis added).
42. Reiss, supra note 30, at 1287.
43. Cf Jordan H. Liebman & Anne S. Kelly, Accountant's Liability to Third Parties for
Negligent Misrepresentation: The Search for a New Limiting Principle, 30 Am. Bus. L.J. 345
(1992). Liebman & Kelly suggest that because the well-established accounting profession would
be fervently opposed, radical structural change in the accountant-client relationship is unlikely.
Id. at 366.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2000).
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authority to set accounting standards [for companies subject to the
Securities Exchange Act] and oversight over the activities of [their]
auditors. 45 Since then, the SEC has looked largely to the profession to
establish both accounting and auditing standards.
In recognition of the profession's expertise, the SEC historically
has relied on private-sector standard-setting bodies to lead efforts in
establishing accounting principles and reporting standards.46 The first
notable initiative was between 1938 and 1959 when the AICPA's Com-
mittee on Accounting Procedure ("CAP") issued fifty-one authoritative
pronouncements called Accounting Research Bulletins ("ARBs"). 47
ARBs formed the basis for what is now known as GAAP.48 The CAP
was replaced by the Accounting Principles Board in 1959, another part-
time body that issued thirty-one new standards in its fourteen-year
existence.4 9
Due to both the increasingly complex business environment and the
public's call for a more independent body, the profession decided that a
new full-time entity was required. As a result, in 1972 primary responsi-
bility for setting accounting standards was transferred to the Financial
Accounting Standards Board ("FASB"), a body independent of the
AICPA.5 ° The FASB promulgates standards on topics ranging from
broad accounting concepts to more specific disclosure requirements.
These standards are recognized by the SEC as authoritative and gener-
ally are required by other users of financial statements.5
Through the AICPA and its predecessor, the accounting profession
also has promulgated audit standards known as Statements on Auditing
Standards ("SAS").52 SAS help to ensure uniformity in audits as well as
45. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, A Brief History of Self-Regulation
(Feb. 20, 2002), at http://www.aicpa.org/info/regulation02.htm. See also Securities & Exchange
Commission, SEC Policy Statement: Establishment and Improvement of Standards Related to
Auditor Independence (July 17, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-7993.htm.
46. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, supra note 45.
47. Id.
48. See supra text accompanying note 29.
49. See AICPA, supra note 45.
50. The FASB operates under the auspices of the Financial Accounting Foundation ("FAF"),
which consists of sixteen trustees, twelve of whom are elected by representatives of FAF's
sponsoring organizations - the AICPA, the American Accounting Association; the Financial
Executive Institute; the Securities Industry Association; the National Association of State
Auditors, Controllers and Treasurers; the Institute of Management Accountants; and the
Government Finance Officers Association. The other four at-large members are appointed by the
FAF itself. The FAF, in turn, appoints the members of the FASB and its advisory council.
Id.
51. Even companies that are not required to file registrations with or report to the SEC often
are required by lenders or shareholders to comply with GAAP.
52. The American Institute of Accountants, the AICPA's predecessor, originally promulgated
ten broad auditing standards known as Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ("GAAS") which
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a minimum level of quality by providing broad audit objectives as well
as defined procedures for their performance.
Peer review has been an essential ingredient of quality control with
respect to the audit.53 Though large firms have engaged in peer review
since the early 1960s as a means to enhance audit quality, the AICPA
made the process compulsory in 1989 for all firms that audited publicly
held companies.54 Peer review is administered by the AICPA's SEC
Practice Section ("SECPS"), which requires all members who audit pub-
licly held companies to work for a firm that belongs to SECPS. A peer
review program is also in place for firms that audit non-SEC registrants.
This program is administered by state CPA organizations and overseen
by the AICPA.56
Auditor independence is an element indispensable to the efficacy of
the independent audit. Although the AICPA also promulgates rules
regarding auditor independence through its Code of Professional Con-
duct,57 the SEC was given statutory authority to define accounting, tech-
nical, and trade terms used in the acts governing issuers required to
were later adopted by the AICPA. Interpretations of GAAS are set out in the SAS. See Reiss,
supra note 30, at 1275 n.61. The Audit Standards Executive Committee was initially charged
with the responsibility of GAAS.
In 1978, the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) was formed as the SEC's successor.
The ASB is now the entity within the AICPA that sets the ground rules for how an
auditor determines whether the information reported in a financial statement is
reasonable and whether it conforms with... (GAAP). It has 15 members, and as a
senior technical committee it is authorized to make public statements without
clearance from the AICPA Council or Board of Directors. As a practical matter,
before promulgating auditing standards, the ASB carefully considers the views of
the SEC's Chief Accountant, as well as the views of many others invited to
comment on the proposals.
A Brief History of Self-Regulation, supra note 45.
Throughout this Comment, GAAS will refer to both the original ten pronouncements as well
as its interpretations.
53. Peer review is the process by which an accounting firm is, in essence, audited by another
accounting firm of comparable size. The purpose of peer review is to ensure that the audits of the
firm under review comply with both GAAP and GAAS. See A Brief History of Self-Regulation,
supra note 45. While I believe that peer review plays an essential role, experience tells me that
this should not be the mainstay of quality control. Because of the severe consequences of failing a
peer review, firms practice what seems to be professional courtesy. This is meant merely to
suggest that prior to a peer review, while the firm under review does not "know" what
engagements will be selected, the firm's management generally has a pretty good idea.
Essentially, peer review is akin to asking the fox to guard the henhouse.
54. See A Brief History of Self-Regulation, supra note 45.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ET § 101
(American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002).
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register offerings or file reports with the SEC. 8 Pursuant to its author-
ity, the SEC maintained its own auditor independence standards for
approximately 60 years. In 1997, however, the SEC decided to look
largely to a private sector body known as the Independence Standards
Board ("ISB") to establish independence standards.59 The ISB is com-
posed equally of members from the accounting profession and the pub-
lic. 6° In 1999, the ISB faced significant issues regarding its efforts to
address auditor independence and asked the SEC to assume the pro-
ject.61 Subsequently, the SEC amended section II of Financial Report-
ing Release No. 50 to state that it would no longer look to the ISB to
establish independence standards, nor would it consider the ISB pro-
nouncements authoritative.62
The above amendment was promulgated approximately six months
before the Enron debacle, the first of the corporate mega-scandals.
Since then, as discussed in Part V, Congress, through the Act, has
directed the SEC to adopt, inter alia, more stringent rules regarding
auditor independence. 63 Although the new requirements address some
valid concerns, many are unworkable and fail to address the most signif-
icant independence and audit quality issues.
III. INCENTIVES TO COMMIT CORPORATE FRAUD OR ENGAGE IN
AGGRESSIVE ACCOUNTING PRACTICES
Because the only boundaries limiting the definition of fraud are
those that limit human knavery, no invariable rule may be prescribed to
such a definition.64 A common definition, however, is "the intentional
use of deceit, a trick or some dishonest means to deprive another of his
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 79t(a) (2000); 15
U.S.C. § 80a-37(a) (2000).
59. SEC Policy Statement: Establishment and Improvement of Standards Related to Auditor
Independence, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-7993.htm.
In FRR 50, issued February 18, 1998, the Commission announced its endorsement
of the ISB. In doing so, however, the Commission stated that it was not abdicating
its authority to modify or supplement ISB standards or... to take such other action
as it may deem appropriate. ... Because of the experimental nature of the ISB, the
Commission also stated in FRR 50 that it would review the operations of the ISB as
necessary or appropriate and evaluate, within five years, whether the framework of
the ISB was serving the public interest and protecting investors.
Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 68 Fed.Reg. 6006, 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003).
64. Geni M. Giannotti & Jason W. Winters, Fraud and the Troubled Company, AM. BANK.
INST. J., June 1993, at 16.
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. . . money, property or a legal right."65 In the capital markets, fraud
often takes the form of a "sham transaction" or intentional misrepresen-
tation of the financial information related to an otherwise legitimate
transaction. Without the requisite intent to deceive, however, "aggres-
sive" accounting practices do not fall within the boundaries of any legal
definition of fraud.66 While fraud must be distinguished from "aggres-
sive" accounting practices, the two share common geneses. Conse-
quently, unless otherwise stated, fraudulent intent will be assumed when
referring to accounting practices in the ensuing discussion.
Corporate fraud can occur at any time during a company's exis-
tence.67 Though its form may vary,68 its causes are relatively similar.
Generally, fraud is commenced in response to financial trouble 69 or
greed. This section will briefly discuss the factors contributing both to
financial trouble and greed, as well as the contribution of GAAP to mis-
representation of financial information.
It is generally believed that most people who engage in fraudulent
financial reporting once were honest people who, for one reason or
another, eventually succumbed to personal or corporate pressure.7 °
Although pressure on corporate management to report positive financial
information has always been severe, the boom of the 1990s illuminated
this point in the extreme. Rare was the investor who did not believe that
his or her investment should yield double-digit returns. Such beliefs
were demonstrated by the punishment visited on companies for failing to
meet quarterly earnings or revenue projections, regardless of the rea-
son. 7 ' Thus, it is not difficult to imagine the substantial pressure to use
fraudulent, not to mention aggressive, accounting practices to inflate a
company's financial position.72
65. See http://dictionary.law.com.
66. It is helpful to understand that GAAP is necessarily fraught with rules that require
management to estimate values or rates. Consequently, reasonable people may disagree on the
proper estimate for a given transaction or account balance. Intent to deceive must be
distinguished from intent to adopt a particular position on the accounting treatment of a particular
transaction. Merely taking a position that others may disagree with does not require intent to
deceive. Inevitably, the measure of a particular position becomes the judgment of a reasonable
disinterested auditor. Thus, to fall within the definition of fraud, accounting treatment must be
beyond the range of reasonableness.
67. Giannotti & Winters, supra note 64, at 16.
68. Examples of fraudulent activity include embezzlement, forgery, expense padding, and
financial misrepresentation. Id.
69. Financial trouble, as discussed infra, may be no more than the fear of the market's
negative reaction to financial information.
70. Giannotti & Winters, supra note 64, at 16.
71. Because many high-tech startups were reporting heavy losses in the 1990s, business
valuations were often driven by the promise of revenue.
72. I recall the efforts of a client to vehemently argue for the recognition of approximately
$25,000 in revenue in the current quarter by questionable characterization of the transaction to
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Also a cause of much fraud is the personal greed of those best in a
position to profit from such fraud. The ability to profit from fraudulent
financial reporting is often a result of the tying of executive compensa-
tion to the company's financial performance via stock-based incen-
tives.7 3 For example, because of the recognition that managers' and
shareholders' incentives must be aligned to solve problems of different
perspectives, stock options have become an increasingly important form
of executive compensation.74
Because options have value to the grantee only if the grantee is "in
the money," meaning the stock price is above the exercise price at the
time of exercise, swings in stock price can mean almost instant wealth
for the executive who holds large amounts of options that are exercisa-
ble in the near future. 75 "More formally, the Black-Scholes option pric-
ing model7 6 instructs us that the value of the executive's stock option
will be increasing both in value of the underlying security and the vari-
ance (since stock options are issued 'at the money')."77 Consequently,
managers have incentives not only to commit fraud to increase stock
price but also to engage in risky ventures that increase stock price vola-
tility.78 Although stock-based incentives align managers' interests with
those of shareholders', they are not without their costs.
avoid the clear language of an SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin. While the amount was immaterial
to the company's quarterly loss, it was approximately 25% of quarterly revenue. It was only after
heated debate that the disagreement was resolved and the revenue properly recognized in the
succeeding quarter. This example is not intended to disparage the company or the integrity of its
executives, but merely to illustrate the pressure to meet analysts' and, therefore, the market's
expectations.
73. See generally Jeffery N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of
the Modem Business Corporation, Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002).
74. Id. at 1245. Stock options are a preferred vehicle primarily because of their "mismatch
between accounting and tax consequences: the grant of stock options is not booked as an
'expense' that reduces accounting earnings, yet, when exercised, options produce a tax deduction
for the firm equal to the difference between the market value of the stock and the exercise price of
the option." Id. Issuances of stock options often are not recorded in the income statement as
compensation expense during the period. Although Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
("SFAS") No. 123 requires income statement recognition of the fair value of employee options
granted, it also allows companies to continue to use Accounting Principles Board ("APB")
Opinion No. 25 and instead make pro forma disclosures in the notes to the financial statements
detailing the fair value of the options granted. Because use of SFAS No. 123 would drag down
earnings, most companies have chosen to report under APB No. 25 and merely make pro forma
disclosures, which are buried in the notes to the financial statements, in the hopes that investors
will pay little attention.
75. Id. at 1246.
76. The Black-Scholes option-pricing model is widely recognized by the accounting
profession as the primary means by which to value stock options. It calculates the theoretical
value of the option by using inputs such as the exercise price, an assumed interest rate, the
underlying stock's volatility and the expiration date of the option.
77. Gordon, supra note 73, at 1246-47.
78. See id.
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Though not nearly as significant as the aforementioned incentives,
the contribution of GAAP to financial misrepresentation is worthy of
brief mention. As any former or practicing auditor can attest, GAAP can
create a labyrinth of complex rules that only an experienced auditor
could hope to understand.79 Without experienced accounting personnel,
management has very little chance of complying with GAAP when
engaged in complex transactions.
Further, many accounting standards require significant managerial
estimates. Consequently, when companies engage in transactions for
which they lack the operating history to accurately estimate results,
those results might well fall outside a reasonable range of values. If the
estimate, while made in good faith, is significant and inaccurate enough,
the impact on stock price could be disastrous because of the unforgiving
market.8 o
For the less honorable, accounting estimates can be a playground
for earnings mismanagement. One common technique, of which the
SEC has taken note, is the use of "cookie jar reserves" to manipulate
earnings.81 Companies can overestimate liabilities or contra-asset
accounts82 in "good years" and then reach in and take the overestimated
amounts back into income in "bad years." Another technique is the "big
bath."83 The term denotes the practice of including charges arguably
unrelated to the specific costs incurred when management decides to
restructure the company's operations.84 This practice is defended by
management under the rubric of conservatism, a fundamental precept of
financial accounting. The force driving this practice is the belief that the
market will forgive a one-time charge.85
79. I am not aware of any "Big Five," now "Big Four," accounting firm that does not have a
significant full time staff of experienced partners or managers whose job is not to deal with
clients, but to serve as technical support to those who work "in the field." These groups not only
provide support, but often serve as liaisons for the firm between the FASB, SEC and other
regulatory bodies.
80. "I recently read of one major U.S. company that failed to meet its so-called 'numbers' by
one penny and lost more than six percent of its stock value in one day." Arthur Levitt, Former
Chairman Securities Exchange Commission, The Numbers Game, Remarks at the NYU Center of
Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/
1998/spch220.txt.
81. See id.
82. A contra asset account is an account that reduces the value of its corresponding asset
account. For example, Allowance for Doubtful Accounts is used to reduce the value of accounts
receivable by the amount management believes to be uncollectible.
83. Levitt, supra note 80.
84. Id.
85. Id. Because of the nature of estimates, it is extremely difficult to suggest, not to mention
prove, any malfeasance with respect to such estimates. Further, conservatism, one of the
fundamental precepts of accounting, appears to be at odds, in this situation, with the goal of the
fair presentation of financial statements.
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The purpose of this last section is not to suggest that GAAP is
ineffective overall, or to argue for another basis of accounting.86 This
section is meant merely to illuminate some of the tensions created by
accounting standards and how companies can "play by the rules" while
manipulating financial reporting outcomes. Although GAAP may have
its problems, many would argue it is the best we have.87
IV. INHERENT CONFLICTS
A. Who Is the Client?
Because the independent auditor renders an opinion on reports
issued to the public that represent a corporation's financial status, he
assumes a public responsibility that transcends the client relationship.88
"[The auditor] ... owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors
and stockholders, as well as to the investing public."89 Chief Justice
Burger's statement underscores not only the Court's but also the public's
view of the triangular relationship among the auditor, the company, and
the public. 9° Most managers and directors appreciate that the auditor's
primary responsibility is to the public. Nevertheless, sometimes it seems
that managers believe auditors should align with management rather
than the public when accounting treatment must be applied in an area in
which reasonable minds differ.
As a predicate to analyzing the complex issues created by this trian-
gle, it is helpful first to understand the nature of the relationships.
Although accounting firms perform many functions, generally auditors
are engaged by their corporate clients to opine on the accuracy of the
entity's financial statements. The engagement usually results from stat-
utory, regulatory, or contractual requirements imposed on the entity. 91
86. GAAP is based on the accrual method of accounting. As discussed supra, other methods
of accounting exist.
87. I believe that significant benefit could be gained by making accounting standards much
less complex, though such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment. It is my experience
that few in the investing public actually understand what they are reading in the financial
statements and footnotes to the financial statements. Further, financial analysts often will
essentially "rewrite" financial statements by "carving out" certain charges. For example, non-cash
deferred compensation charges for employee stock options issued below fair value are often
pulled out of earnings per share.
88. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984).
89. Id. at 818.
90. While auditors do not function as advocates, the relationship may be compared fairly to
that of the lawyer and his corporate client. For a discussion of the triangular relationship among
lawyers, corporations, and the public, see Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., "Triangular Lawyer
Relationships": An Exploratory Analysis, I GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 15 (1987).
91. Rarely does an entity engage an auditor to ensure its compliance with GAAP absent a
third party requirement. As discussed supra, the Securities Act of 1933 requires an audit of the
financial statements of an issuer seeking to register offerings of securities under that act. Further,
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Consequently, the auditor's work product, its opinion, is primarily used
by third parties.
Although auditors and their clients understand the nature of the
engagement well, clients nevertheless appear to expect, and the AICPA
guidelines require,92 a certain level of loyalty. The loyalty starts with
the duty not to disclose confidential client information.93 However, as
the relationship grows over the years, the expectation grows as well.
More particularly, over the long-term, clients begin to expect a certain
amount of flexibility from the auditor. Because of the subjectivity of
accounting estimates, this flexibility primarily appears in estimates. For
example, if management takes a position on a given estimate that the
auditor does not believe to be the best available choice, the auditor may
nevertheless acquiesce because the estimate arguably falls within the
bounds of reason.94 The judicial analogue for this standard of review
would be "abuse of discretion." The necessary implication of such a
standard is that decisions are being made not on the basis of what the
auditor believes to be the best choice, but rather on the basis of whether
the client's choice is "reasonable" under the circumstances. Or, for the
more cynical, "Can we defend this practice if we are hauled into court?"
Because the line between intentional misstatements and aggressive
accounting is so tenuous, aggressive accounting practices are easily jus-
tified, maybe appropriately, in the minds of management and auditors. 95
publicly traded companies are statutorily required to be audited annually and reviewed quarterly.
Most private lenders or equity financiers also condition the advancement of capital on a "clean"
audit opinion.
92. See AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ET § 301
(American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2002) (discussing confidential client information).
93. Id. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, it is worth mentioning that this duty
appears on its face to conflict with the purpose of the Securities Acts as well as the nature of an
audit itself. However, during the course of an audit, auditors are privy to many types of
proprietary information, including methodologies, customer lists, and management's strategic
plans. As a result, disclosure of certain confidential information has broad implications regarding
the client's viability. For example, management may solicit the advice of its auditors about the
consequences of a particular transaction. Often such a transaction could have a significant impact
on the financial position of the company. If management had not yet decided on a course of
action, and this information was made public, the market might react violently to a mere
contingency.
94. Because auditors, like other gatekeepers, are rational actors, they are driven by the
perceived level of risk associated with a given course of action. They may acquiesce to the
client's request for "flexibility" because they perceive the risk associated with such acquiescence
as less than the cost of a strained client relationship. See generally Partnoy, supra note 27, at 494.
95. This statement merely reflects the auditor's struggle to reconcile the client's position with
the auditor's best judgment. Because there is often no "right" answer with respect to an estimate,
any position within certain bounds can be justified even though it may not be the "best answer."
Plausible arguments may be made on either side of the fence: The estimate is too conservative and
the company is creating a "cookie jar reserve" or the estimate is too aggressive and the value is
not realizable.
[Vol. 58:891
THE TOOTHLESS WATCHDOG
From the above discussion, it is not necessary to infer that an audi-
tor's acquiescence to a management position is grounded in anything
other than the desire to "play by the rules" while accommodating its
client. It does, however, demonstrate the inherent conflicts in the rela-
tionship among the auditor, the client, and the public. Though these
conflicts are reconcilable, they may be undermining the auditor's reputa-
tion, and thus his viability as a gatekeeper for the capital markets.
B. Audit Status and Fee Incentives
This section explains corporate managers' perception of the audit
as well as the nature and reasons behind the shift in audit methodology
and audit fee structures. Further, this section suggests that changes in
fee structure have affected audit quality.
Clients often perceive an audit as having little benefit outside of
satisfying an externally imposed requirement.96 It is just another cost
the company and its employees must bear. Any auditor can attest to the
all too familiar look of disdain on the client's face when the auditor
arrives with laptops and supply kits in hand. This means only one thing
to the client's accounting staff - more work. To the entity's upper
management, it means explanations of past transactions that often
require complex schedules and voluminous reports to support. As a
result, managers often feel as though their judgment, and sometimes
their integrity, is being questioned. Because this sentiment represents
the opinion of many if not most clients, it is fair to say that the audit is
viewed largely as a commodity.97
Though managers of both large and small entities subscribe to the
audit commodity view, large entities may have significant justification.98
Most reporting companies99 have highly competent financial and
accounting personnel who are able to perform all but the most important
function of an auditor - the opinion of an independent third party. In
96. See Bryant G. Garth & Carole Silver, The MDP Challenge in the Context of
Globalization, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 903, 919 (2002).
97. See id.
98. Many smaller companies do not employ personnel with the requisite expertise to account
for business transactions in accordance with GAAP. Also, such personnel often do not have the
skills to evaluate and structure their employer's business processes to ensure, inter alia, adequate
financial reporting or control of assets.
99. Reporting companies are those companies subject to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Three categories of companies are subject to the '34 Act's continuous disclosure
requirements: 1) companies that have a class of securities listed on a national
exchange(Section 12(b)), 2) companies that have assets in excess of $10 million and
that have a class of equity securities held by at least 500 persons (Section 12(g) and
Rule 12g-1), and 3) companies that have filed a '33 Act registration statement that
has become effective (Section 15(d)).
JAMEs D. Cox ET AL., SECuOrnEs REGULATION: CASES AND MATEIAL 8 (3d ed. 2001).
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fact, it would be safe to say that there are few chief accounting and
financial personnel in reporting companies who do not have significant
Big Five experience.,l1
Because of the audit's commodity status among corporate manage-
ment, "and the rise in importance of the Chief Financial Officer (in
many cases a former partner of the Big Five).... there is intense compe-
tition over fees."' '  Such fierce competition, coupled with manage-
ment' s view of auditor interchangeability, has forced accounting firms to
bid for audit clients on a fixed-fee basis rather than an hourly basis as
was common in the 1960s and 1970s.' 02 Previously, junior auditors
often were billed at four times their cost. 10 3 Now, it is typical for the
billing ratio to fall below two, or even one, when the accounting firm is
faced with a competitive bid.'" This type of fee arrangement has con-
siderable implications with respect to audit profitability, therefore
increasing the potential for diminution of audit quality.' 0 5 Accounting
firms have done little to change this view, and in fact may have aided in
perpetuating the audit's commodity status by submitting low-ball bids
for new or continuing audit engagements.
Often times, accounting firms will employ the audit in a "loss
leader" strategy. 10 6  The loss leader strategy works by pricing the
engagement below the accounting firm's cost to perform the audit in
order to create a relationship with the client. This strategy can be used
both with large and small clients. During the late 1990s, the strategy
was used extensively when bidding for startup companies. The hope
was that the client would go public, and the firm then would be able to
charge full fees for the initial public offering. The strategy is also an
effective way to gain access to a client that later would use the firm's
extensive consulting practice - at full fees, of course. The problem is
that by low-balling bids for audit engagements, the accounting firm
100. The Big Five strive to place outgoing personnel in the employ of their clients. This
practice primarily serves to retain clients. However, the practice also has the ancillary benefit of
making an audit more efficient. Lately, this practice has been the subject of much government
scrutiny. See generally Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence, SEC Release Nos. 33-8183, 34-47265, 35-27642 (Feb. 5, 2003).
101. Garth & Silver, supra note 96, at 919.
102. Id. Though fee structures vary, the fixed fee is now the most prevalent arrangement with
larger companies. It is often contingent on complete cooperation of the client, meaning that the
accounting staff has the necessary audit evidence prepared before the auditors arrive in the field.
In return, large clients often require the audit partner, manager, and senior to have experience in
their particular industry.
103. Max H. Bazerman, The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, SLOAN MGT. REV., Sept.
22, 1997, at 89.
104. Id.
105. See Garth & Silver, supra note 96, at 919-20.
106. See 65 Fed. Reg. 76008, 76015-6 (2003).
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sends a message, to the client and the firm's employees, that its audit
services are fungible. 107
Before discussing the consequences of the fixed-fee arrangement, it
is instructive to briefly examine the organizational structure of an
accounting firm as well as audit procedures. Accounting firms, much
like law firms, generally are organized under applicable law as either
partnerships or limited liability companies. Also like law firms, but per-
haps even more so, accounting firms' organizational charts bear strong
resemblance to a pyramid. This structure allows firms to leverage their
junior employees by using them to perform a large portion of the
work. ' 8 For example, typical staffing for an audit of a mid-sized public
client might include a partner, manager, senior, and two to four staff."°
Fixed-fee arrangements, in conjunction with the increased com-
plexity of business systems, have provided strong incentives for
accounting firms to rethink the audit process as well as their general
business practices.110 Audit procedures have changed to focus more on
business processes and less on individual account balances."' Such
changes both were necessary to respond to technological progress, and
desirable to change the audit's status by providing value to the audit
process." 2 The change in audit process also provided, subsequent to the
implementation period, the ancillary benefit of increased profitability for
audit engagements. Because companies' major business processes gen-
erally do not change frequently, economies could be gained by testing
the business process thoroughly one year and then performing more lim-
ited testing in subsequent years, absent significant change in the busi-
ness process. Further, by emphasizing control testing, work could be
more evenly distributed during the year while performing the company's
quarterly review." 3 Therefore, accounting firms could increase effi-
107. See id.
108. Garth & Silver, supra note 96, at 918-19; See also, Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning
Auditors' Incentives, 35 CONN. L. REV., 989, 994 n.21 (2003).
109. As discussed infra, a concurring partner is also assigned to engagements with public
clients.
110. As discussed infra, this may have had an impact on audit quality.
11. See Garth & Silver, supra note 96, at 920 n.51 (quoting DAvID GRAYSON ALLEN &
KATHLEEN McDERMOTr, ACCOUNTING FOR SUCCESS: A HISTORY OF PRICE WATERHOUSE IN
AMERICA 1890-1990 (1993)). Deloitte & Touche was among the first to implement an almost
paperless audit. During my tenure at Arthur Andersen, the firm had fully instituted a new audit
process called "the Business Audit." Generally speaking, the Business Audit focused testing on
risk areas by methods other than "substantive testing," such as process testing. While testing
internal controls had always been included in audit programs, the Business Audit placed much
greater reliance on control testing as opposed to substantiation of account balances.
112. Because there is a greater emphasis on processes, management recommendations on
improving control or efficiency could be more extensive than in the past.
113. A review is of more limited scope than an audit. Consequently, the auditor does not
express an opinion as to whether the quarterly financial statements are materially misstated.
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ciency during historically slow times, allowing greater leverage of staff
during year-end.
Though accounting theorists may disagree on whether a greater
emphasis should be placed on control testing as opposed to individual
account balance substantiation, none could plausibly argue that fixed
fees are conducive to a more thorough audit. Because greater hours
worked does not equate to greater hours billed in a fixed-fee arrange-
ment, there is an underlying incentive to do less work, or at a minimum
to have the least expensive employees perform the greatest amount of
work.' 14 Though there is considerable pressure to increase engagement
profitability, it is not necessary to infer that firms are performing less
than GAAS audits. It is fair to infer, however, that the squeeze on audit
profitability results in pressure on the auditor to perform the minimum
work required to comply with GAAS, rather than to expand audit proce-
dures beyond those required.
The significance of all this is that market forces have combined
with accounting firms' responses to produce incentives that on their face
conflict with the purpose of an audit. It is uncertain whether audit qual-
ity has been seriously affected by these factors. Nonetheless, one could
not seriously contend that such factors are conducive to increasing audit
quality. Rational economic actors will seek to maximize profit, and, cer-
tainly, accountants are rational economic actors." 5
C. Multi-Disciplinary Practice
Largely as a result of the squeeze on audit fees, accounting firms
began to search for other more lucrative services to provide to clients. "16
Realizing that their audit relationships provided ample opportunity to
design services clients would value, firms began recruiting MBAs and
other non-accountants. The hope was to provide a broader array of ser-
vices that would supplement the lower profit margins of audits.'
114. Garth and Silver suggest that audit staffing is more vertical than the previous pyramid
shape. See Garth & Silver, supra note 96, at 920. Though partner and manager time may have
increased due to increased complexity of business transactions and client demands, speaking
anecdotally, I submit that the audit engagement's staffing structure is still heavily weighted at the
bottom. For instance, when budgeting for a typical mid-sized public client, partner and manager
time would be approximately ten to fifteen percent of total time spent on the client.
115. Some might argue that damage to a firm's reputational capital from misstatements will
provide incentive to expand the scope of audit procedures. This argument, though appealing,
lacks merit. Because auditor liability generally is determined by comparing the auditor's actions
to audit standards that the accounting profession creates, the standards can be changed to
accommodate decreases in audit profitability.
116. Garth & Silver, supra note 96, at 920.
117. Id. at 921. Such services include: tax consulting, enterprise resource planning, risk
consulting, actuarial services, litigation support, strategic management consulting, due diligence
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Eventually the firms became known as Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships
("MDPs").
MDPs have been and continue to be the subject of heated debate.' 18
The arguments are complex. In fact, entire scholarly works are devoted
to the subject.' 19 The following section is intended merely to give a
brief overview of the arguments regarding MDP practice as they relate
to auditor independence.
The central theme of the MDP critic's argument is that fees derived
from non-audit services impair auditor independence. 20 They contend
that because non-audit fees generally are more lucrative, and in some
situations account for more than half of total fees derived from a client,
auditors are reluctant to confront clients on the appropriateness of
accounting policies for fear of being replaced.' 2 ' Consequently, man-
agement can persuade the firm to buy off on overly aggressive or even
inappropriate accounting treatment.
Proponents, principally accounting firms, argue that such services
do not impair independence if they do not involve a financial interest in
the client or the performance of certain accounting services for an audit
client, both of which are prohibited by the profession.' 22 Additionally,
working with management in a more cooperative capacity to evaluate
and help design business processes allows the auditor not only to take a
more proactive stance, but also to obtain more detailed knowledge than
an audit would otherwise permit. Thus, auditors would be better able to
identify and analyze risk areas.' 23
Regardless of whether non-audit fees actually impair independence,
the public believes that they do.'24 As will be discussed in the next
section, much of the new legislation is aimed at reducing and monitoring
the amount of non-audit fees accounting firms may derive from audit
services, outsourcing, and virtually anything else not prohibited by professional or regulatory
authorities.
118. See generally Peter C. Kostant, Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary
Partnerships in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1213 (2000).
119. See generally Garth & Silver, supra note 96; Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified
Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 977 (2003).
120. See McCoy, supra note 108, at 991.
121. See generally Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence, SEC Release Nos. 33-8183, 34-47265, 35-27642 (Feb. 5, 2003).
122. AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, ET § 101.02-.05
(American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 2003) (showing that direct or indirect investments
in clients as well as performing management functions such as decision making are considered to
impair independence).
123. Point in fact: Internal procedures at Andersen required the inclusion of the Computer Risk
Management Group on an audit when the client had substantial computer information systems.
124. Gretchen Morgenson, Market Watch; On Reform, It's Time to Walk the Walk, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2002, at C I.
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clients. Although non-audit fees are generally more profitable than audit
fees, I believe that substantial audit fees could easily breed the same
reluctance to confront management on difficult issues. The audit's com-
modity status makes terminating an audit client extremely unattractive.
This assertion is supported by the fact that only 348 accounting firms
resigned from clients in 2002, with 59 related to independence issues or
concerns about company practices. 125
PricewaterhouseCoopers's (PWC) promise to take a tougher stance
with corporate clients using aggressive accounting policies is illustrative
of accounting firms' reluctance to resign.1 26 Recently, PWC stated that
"in any case where we cannot resolve concerns about the quality of the
information we are receiving or about the integrity of the management
teams with whom we are working, we will resign." 12 7 This declaration
is nothing new. Though professional standards are not specific as to
when an auditor should resign, audit standards require assessment of
management integrity and potential disagreement on application of
accounting principles before an audit firm accepts a new client. PWC's
statement merely confirms the public's perception that accounting firms
have historically bent over backward to maintain the client relationship.
Because the appearance of auditor independence is as important to the
role of the independent audit as independence in fact, reform efforts do
not go far enough to change the public's skepticism about the allegiance
of audit firms.
V. LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
With the collapse of Enron and other corporate giants, Congress
was forced to address public demands for greater protection from
unscrupulous corporate managers. On July 30, 2002, Congress
responded with the Act. 128 With respect to the independent audit, the
Act has two key provisions: section 1 establishes a Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (the "PCAOB"), and section 2 addresses
auditor independence.
The PCAOB is a non-governmental agency, overseen by the SEC,
whose purpose is to monitor audits of companies subject to the federal
securities laws.129 The Act vests the PCAOB with substantial regulatory
control over accounting firms that audit entities subject to the Securities
125. Jonathan D. Glater, Pricewaterhouse Takes a Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2003, at Cl
(citing Auditor-Trak, a publisher of accounting industry data).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
129. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 101(a), 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
[Vol. 58:891
2004] THE TOOTHLESS WATCHDOG
Exchange Act of 1934 or the Securities Act of 1933. This control is
exercised by requiring public accounting firms subject to the Act to reg-
ister with the PCAOB and subjecting those firms to PCAOB inspections,
investigations, and disciplinary proceedings when appropriate.1 3° Fur-
ther, the PCAOB has the authority to establish or adopt auditing, quality
control, ethics, independence, and other audit-related standards for regis-
tered firms. 13
1
The second key provision, entitled Auditor Independence, will be
the focus of this section. Section 201 appears to be the most daunting to
accounting firms. It prohibits auditors from providing certain non-audit
services to audit clients and requires any non-prohibited services to be
preapproved by the company's audit committee. 32 Although the prohi-
bition of non-audit services might seem apropos in light of recent events,
such measures do not completely address the independence issues.
Indeed, many of the services prohibited by the Act already were prohib-
ited by SEC rules before the Enron debacle. For example, firms could
not design or implement for audit clients hardware or software systems
that aggregate source data underlying the financial statements. 33 Con-
sequently, with the exception of the audit committee approval require-
ment and the additional prohibition of certain other services, section 201
on its face appears superfluous.
Section 203 of the Act, though appearing to codify what already
has been required by the profession, audit partner rotation, 134 subjects
130. Id. §§ 101, 102.
131. Id. § 101(c).
132. The following are prohibited services under section 201 of the Act:
(1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records or financial
statements of the audit client;
(2) financial information systems design and implementation;
(3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-in-kind reports;
(4) actuarial services;
(5) internal audit outsourcing services;
(6) management functions or human resources;
(7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking services;
(8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and
(9) any other service that the Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible.
133. See 65 Fed. Reg. 76008, 76045 (Dec. 5, 2000).
134. Compare Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor
Independence, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006, 6017-18 with AICPA SEC Practice Section, Requirements of
Members, available at http://www.aicpa.orglmembers/div/secps/require.htm., which provides as
follows:
Assign a new audit partner to be in charge of each SEC engagement that has had
another audit partner-in-charge for a period of seven consecutive years, and prohibit
such incumbent partner from returning to in-charge status on the engagement for a
minimum of two years except as follows:
(1) This requirement does not apply to member firms that have less than five SEC
audit clients and less than ten partners.
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audit partners to PCAOB sanctions and other potential liability. Section
203 makes it unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to audit an
entity subject to the Securities Acts if either the lead or reviewing audit
partner has performed audit services for that entity for each of the previ-
ous five years.' 35 Aside from subjecting the audit partner to liability
under the Act, the only significant contributions were changing the pro-
fession's seven-year rotation requirement to a five-year requirement and
broadening the rotation requirement to reviewing partners. This effort,
though attractive at first glance, fails to recognize fully the nature of the
firms' relationships with their clients.
The audit partner rotation requirement is intended to provide a fresh
look at the engagement, while at the same time maintain engagement
continuity.'3 6 The rotation requirement might have more merit if the
partner assuming engagement responsibility after the five-year period
were someone situated halfway across the world rather than someone
seated in the office next door. It borders on the ridiculous to assume that
the new audit partner will not have significant discussions with the out-
going partner about the audit risks of the particular client. Based on
those discussions, the new partner, though he brings a different perspec-
tive, already will have his perception altered. Thus, the "fresh look"
might be better termed "fresh-frozen." Further, partner rotation does
nothing to address the considerable pressure management can continue
to place on the audit firm.
Although section 206 is not new conceptually, it significantly
extends prior SEC rules.' 37 Section 206 relates to conflicts of interest
and makes it unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to audit an
entity subject to the Securities Acts, if certain of the entity's chief
officers, or anyone serving in an equivalent position, were "employed by
that registered independent public accounting firm and participated in
any capacity in the audit of that [entity] during the 1-year period preced-
ing the date of the initiation of the audit."' 38
Pursuant to the authority of section 208(a) of the Act, the SEC has
(2) An audit partner who has been the audit partner-in-charge of an SEC audit
client for seven consecutive years may continue to serve in that capacity for
audits for periods ending within two years from the date the firm becomes a
member, or within two years from the date the firm no longer qualifies for the
exemption in (1) above, whichever is later.
135. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 203, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
136. See Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 68
Fed. Reg. 6006, 6017 (Feb. 5, 2003).
137. See id. at 6007.
138. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 206, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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promulgated rules ("Final Rules") regarding auditor independence, 39
expanding audit client employment restrictions. Previously, under SEC
rules, independence was impaired if "a former partner . . . or profes-
sional employee ... accepts employment with a client if he or she has a
continuing financial interest in the accounting firm or is in a position to
influence the firm's operations or financial policies."' 4 ° While the pre-
vious rules still apply, the Final Rule significantly extends the presump-
tion's reach. The Final Rule, as required by the Act, not only requires a
one-year "cooling-off' period but also extends the loss of independence
to situations in which "any member of the audit ... team who provides
more than ten hours of audit, review or attest services for the issuer
accepts a position with the issuer in a financial reporting oversight
role."''
"Financial reporting oversight role" is defined as including those
individuals who have direct responsibility for or supervise the prepara-
tion of the financial statements and related information included in docu-
ments filed with the SEC.14 2 Such a broad definition would provide a
model that would preclude audit seniors 43 from employment with an
ongoing audit client. Given that audit seniors are often used for brief
periods on clients that are not "theirs," this seems like a heavy burden
for both the auditors and the clients to bear. For example, small public
clients often hire more experienced seniors as the personnel responsible
for financial accounting and reporting. Given the rate of attrition in
accounting firms, and the companies' need for competent financial
reporting personnel, this definition appears too restrictive.
Another change implemented by the Final Rules, but not expressly
required by the Act, is the prohibition of audit partner compensation
"based on the act of selling non-audit services."" The prohibition's
rationale is that such compensation would impair an auditor's objectivity
because it may create financial self-interest. 45 Although compensation
based on a percentage of sales provides a more direct relationship
139. See Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence,
supra note 134.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 6008.
142. Id. at 6026.
143. Generally, an audit senior has three to six years of experience. He or she is the daily
liaison between the audit partner and the client. Further, he or she is responsible for planning the
audit, with partner and manager oversight, coordinating and training junior staff, and managing
the daily audit operations.
144. Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, supra
note 134, at 6024.
145. See, e.g., AICPA, Practice Alert 99-1, Guidance for Independence Discussions with Audit
Committees (May 1999).
2004]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
between effort and reward, the suggestion that such a prohibition sub-
stantially dissipates any financial self-interest is not warranted. Even
with such a prohibition, the economic incentive to sell non-audit ser-
vices remains. Because partners share profits of the partnership, their
selling efforts, while benefiting other partners, also serve their own self-
interests.
There is little doubt that restrictions on non-audit services, employ-
ment relationships, and mandatory audit partner rotation under Title II of
the Act are a commendable start. These measures, however, do not ade-
quately address key disincentives to perform quality audits or the pub-
lic's perception that auditors secretly swear allegiance to their clients.
Additional reforms are needed to cure the structural infirmities that
threaten quality audits and to change the public's perception of auditor-
client relationships.
VI. A VISION OF THE FUTURE: ADDITIONAL REFORMS
Based on the public's outcry and congressional response, it appears
that the auditor's perceived role has morphed again. Whereas auditors
once were viewed as watchdogs, now lawmakers are trying to breed a
new type of canine, a bloodhound. 46 Congress has made explicit the
critical role auditors play as guardians of the financial markets. Given
the auditor's starring role in a global production, the time is ripe for
legislators to point their compass in a new direction. Because the
appearance of independence is of primary concern, two additional
reforms are needed: mandatory rotation of audit firms every seven years
and a movement to structured hourly-based fees.
Section 207 of the Act requires the Comptroller of the United
States to "conduct a study and review of the potential effects of requir-
ing the mandatory rotation of registered public accounting firms."' 4 7
Such a requirement illustrates congressional concerns that audit quality
may be impaired by long-standing relationships between auditors and
their clients. Proponents of mandatory rotation make three significant
arguments. First, because auditors grow too close to their client's man-
agement, they lose the requisite skepticism. 48 Second, auditors become
desensitized to the client, therefore anticipating results rather than keep-
ing alert to subtle circumstantial changes.' 49 Third, in order to maintain
146. See Kostant, supra note 118, at 1243 (2000).
147. Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 207, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
148. See AICPA, Statement of Position Regarding Mandatory Rotation of Audit Firms of
Publicly Held Companies, available at http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/secps/lit/sops/
1900.htm.
149. Id.
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the client relationship, auditors are tempted to smooth over problems. 5 °
In contrast, critics of mandatory rotation argue that audits are
strengthened by institutional continuity, rotation is disruptive and would
increase overall audit costs, and rotation of principal individuals occurs
naturally.1 5 1 While critics offer valid concerns, given the current state of
corporate affairs, public confidence in auditor independence must over-
ride such concerns. In this section, I will endeavor to show that these
concerns are not as significant as critics would have us believe, and, in
any event, they do not override the need to regain the appearance of
independence. Further, the current fee structure, discussed in Part IV,
requires restructuring.
The assertion that audits are strengthened by institutional continuity
appears to have merit on its face. When viewed in conjunction with the
assertion that rotation of principal individuals occurs naturally, however,
it does not withstand attack. Though it is difficult to argue that continu-
ous audit relationships provide little benefit, a deeper look at the rela-
tionship belies the continuity of which critics speak.
As discussed above, most audit work is performed by senior and
staff auditors. Given that the rate of attrition is between twenty-two and
twenty-eight percent for national accounting firms and seven and ten
percent for local firms, 52 most audit clients experience frequent rotation
of audit personnel. Further, most of this rotation occurs at the junior and
senior levels. Because junior staff and seniors are responsible for the
majority of the audit work, most of the efficiencies are gained, or lost, at
this level. With respect to partner and manager continuity, although it
would suffer somewhat, current regulations already require rotation of
engagement partners. 153
After accounting for admitted attrition, the critics' efficiency argu-
ment is little more than empty rhetoric. It is difficult to believe that any
significant efficiency could be gained from such things as audit file loca-
tion, baseline fees, and preprinted labels.
No doubt, information may be shared more easily among partners
in the same firm, as in the case of a partner rotating off of an engage-
ment, than between successor and predecessor auditors.' 54 Neverthe-
less, informational barriers between firms are minimized by the fact that
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. David Satava, The A to Z of Keeping Staff, 195 J. Acr. 4 (2003). Anecdotally, I began
work in 1997 with approximately 35 staff auditors; by the middle of 2001, roughly 10 remained.
153. Strengthening the Commission's Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, supra
note 134.
154. Professional Standards require that a successor auditor communicate with the predecessor
auditor before accepting a new engagement. SAS 84, supra note 31, at AU § 315.03-.11.
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professional standards recommend, 55 and sound firm policies demand,
that successor auditors review predecessor audit work papers before
accepting a new engagement. Further, sharing client information
between rotating audit partners in an effort to gain greater efficiency
strengthens the proposition that mandatory audit partner rotation is
insufficient to provide a "fresh look" to the audit. Much of the remain-
ing inefficiencies attributable to a change in audit firms could be
recouped in the ensuing seven years, to the extent allowed by natural
attrition.
Because the appearance of independence is integral to the audit's
function in the capital markets, the minimal efficiencies gained merely
by leaving the "institution" in place, do not justify the diminution of the
appearance of independence. In fact, given public animosity toward
longstanding audit relationships, it seems likely that investors would
rather pay slightly higher audit fees in exchange for additional assurance
that auditors were not in bed with their clients.
Mandatory rotation also would serve to divorce accounting firms
from their audit clients. Because the audit relationship would no longer
be permanent, the temptation to acquiesce to aggressive accounting poli-
cies for fear of being replaced would decrease sharply. 156 Mandatory
rotation, combined with already significant public and regulatory scru-
tiny when changing auditors, 57 would leave management with little lev-
erage when pushing aggressive accounting policies. Some argue,
however, that mandatory rotation is not enough to sever the ties that
bind auditors to their clients. 58
Those who believe that stronger measures are appropriate contend
chiefly that objectivity and independence are illusory so long as the
auditor is paid by the entity under audit. 59 One interesting alternative
suggests that auditors should work for insurance companies rather than
the audited entities. 6 ° Under this proposal, financial statements would
be insured against misrepresentations up to specified amounts.' 6' This
suggestion is appealing because it would disconnect auditors from their
clients while at the same time provide oversight by insurers, which have
strong economic incentives to have the financial statements free of mis-
155. Id. at AU § 315.11.
156. McCoy, supra note 108, at 1008.
157. SEC registrants are required to file form 8-k upon a change of auditors. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 249.308 and Form 8-k.
158. See McCoy, supra note 108, at 1008.
159. Id. at 1009.
160. JULIUS CHERNY ET AL., FINANCIAL STATEMENT INSURANCE (working Paper Abstract,
Mar. 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstracti=303784).
161. McCoy, supra note 108, at 1010.
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representations. 162 Nevertheless, this proposal is not without its costs.
One such cost is the potential problem of moral hazard. 163 Because
auditors' work would be insured, there would be less incentive to act
with care. Also, audit quality would be jeopardized further because
auditors, realizing the potential for a permanent relationship with the
insurer, would low-ball their bids in order to gain access to insurers,
therefore increasing the squeeze on engagement profitability. As dis-
cussed above, decreases in audit profitability provide incentive to reduce
costs by reducing audit procedures. Lastly, contractual arrangements
between the insurers and audited companies would end up looking like
any other liability policy. Insurers, seeking to reduce risk through
reductions in coverage, systematically would begin to exclude certain
types of misstatements, thereby shifting risks back to investors and mul-
tiplying litigation with respect to excluded risks.
Though changing one of the contracting parties to the audit rela-
tionship addresses certain concerns about the independence of auditors,
it fails to recognize the impact of engagement profitability on audit qual-
ity and the impact of longstanding institutional relationships on the
appearance of independence.
In addition to, and perhaps more important than, mandatory rota-
tion, standardized, hourly-based fees are needed to provide greater eco-
nomic incentive for quality audits."6  Low-balling and fixed-fee
arrangements are inconsistent with the performance of more rigorous
audit work. Consequently, engagement profitability can be improved
only by doing less work or the same work more quickly. Even among
auditors of the highest integrity, these factors are bound to result in com-
promised quality. 165
Because the current fee structure contains an inherent impediment
to audit quality, the structure should be revisited. History has shown
that accounting firms, when faced with intense competition for audit cli-
ents, will consistently underbid to "buy" the client.' 66 Because the mar-
ket cannot remedy the inherent conflict between engagement
profitability and audit quality, the fee structure should be regulated by
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Though Robert Chatov and others argue that standardized fees, inter alia, are needed,
supra note 23, this suggestion has not been seriously considered.
165. See Bazerman, supra note 103 (arguing that under current auditor-client relationships
audit failures are inevitable); James L. Costello, The Auditor's Responsibilities for Fraud
Detection and Disclosure: Do the Auditing Standards Provide a Safer Harbor?, 43 ME. L. REv.
265, 268 n. 11 (1991) (stating that there are certain factors, such as fee incentives, that work
against detection of fraud).
166. Bazerman, supra note 103.
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the PCAOB through implementing a fee floor based on time studies and
other standard factors.
Audit procedures, and therefore audit fees, are largely driven by the
size and type of entity under audit. For example, certain industries
require large capital outlays for tangible personal and real property,
while the balance sheets of others are rife with goodwill and other intan-
gible property. Because financial statements within an industry tend to
share common characteristics, a fee floor initially could be established
by industry class and entity size.'6 7 The fee floor would resemble a cost
plus fee structure by including a given profit margin. Though audit fees
would be permitted to exceed the fee floor applicable to the size and
industry of the client, they would not be permitted to fall below such
floor. Because the Act already grants the PCAOB authority to investi-
gate accounting firms and review audit procedures 168 and accounting
firms already track engagement profitability, compliance with fee floors
could be monitored with little additional cost.
Hourly-based fee floors would address a number of concerns about
audit quality and auditor independence. First, they would reward dili-
gence and create an incentive to more thoroughly investigate audit
issues. 16  Second, audit profitability would not be so tightly squeezed.
As shown by the restriction on non-audit fees, Congress was concerned
that accounting firms would be more willing to bend to client demands
for fear of losing lucrative fees. Because audits would be more profita-
ble and auditors would be required to rotate every seven years, the temp-
tation to acquiesce to client demands would be diminished.
Undoubtedly, audit clients would oppose the fee floor because they
would no longer be able to drive audit fees down to the level allowed by
a highly competitive market. Nevertheless, the benefit of increased pub-
lic confidence in the efficacy of the audit and independence of the audi-
tor ultimately would reduce those very clients' cost of capital, therefore
compensating for the increased audit fees. Further, because the audit
has been made vital to the welfare of our economy, and because the
audit's genesis lies in the Securities Acts, regulation of audit profitabil-
ity is hardly inappropriate. 170
In summary, the urgent need to regain public confidence in auditor
167. Admittedly, the financial statements of entities in the same industry may vary drastically.
Nevertheless, industry classification would merely serve as a baseline for a fee range.
168. Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 101, 102, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
169. Some may argue that costs would skyrocket. Given, however, the pressure to keep fees
down and the required scrutiny of accounting firms by both audit committees and the PCAOB,
serious abuses would be highly unlikely.
170. Government regulation of profit is not a new concept. Many companies bidding for
government work are required to enter into cost plus contracts.
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independence requires bold new steps, however unpopular with the
accounting profession and its clients. Regardless of whether auditor
independence and audit quality have actually been impaired by auditor-
client relationships, the public believes they have, and public perception
is what matters.
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